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Abstract 
 
An inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the literature on the measurement of 
welfare is that the use of consumer’s surplus is a bad idea. This is especially true in the 
light of the fact that modern computing power facilitates the straightforward calculation 
of equivalent variation, the operational welfare indicator that is most strongly justified by 
economic theory. Consequently, a correct welfare analysis of a price-wealth change of 
the sort discussed in virtually every cost-benefit text should be principally in terms of 
Hicksian demand curves, not ordinary (Marshallian) ones. The present paper explains 
how to construct a graphical depiction of such an analysis, in partial equilibrium, which 
may be adopted in teaching the principles of cost-benefit analysis to graduate and 
advanced undergraduate students. This is done by way of several detailed examples 
covering the scope of applicability of the technique. In addition, a new formula for 
approximating equivalent variation is developed and analyzed. 
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1. Introduction 
More than two decades have now passed since the lack of validity of consumer’s 
surplus as a welfare measure was demonstrated rigorously and reasonable alternatives 
were proposed. Chipman and Moore (1976, 1980) showed that restrictive and empirically 
untenable assumptions on preferences are necessary in order to make consumer’s surplus 
a valid measure. McKenzie and Pearce (1976) and Vartia (1983) provided procedures that 
facilitate the calculation of a generalized version of Hick’s (1942) equivalent variation—
an operational welfare indicator that “resolves the conceptual problem of [individual] 
welfare measurement” (Slesnick, 1998, p. 2112)—without the imposition of restrictions 
on the form of the ordinary demand function other than the standard integrability 
conditions. Despite these advances, and despite the fact that modern computational power 
is more than up to the task of handling their inherent complexity, consumer’s surplus 
continues to be “the overwhelming choice as a welfare indicator [in] empirical cost-
benefit analyses” (Slesnick, 1998, p. 2110). 
Part of the blame for this state of affairs must be assigned to the texts used to 
teach cost-benefit analysis (CBA). While most of these texts acknowledge the problems 
with using consumer’s surplus as a welfare measure, they go ahead and do so anyway 
after either minimizing the attendant problems or claiming that appropriate adjustments 
can be made when necessary. For example, Boardman et al. (2001, p. 64) states that  
the biased estimate of [equivalent variation] that results from using 
Marshallian rather than Hicksian demand schedules to measure [welfare 
change] depends on the size of the income effect associated with a price 
change. Usually this income effect and, hence, the bias are small and can 
be safely ignored in CBA. [Emphasis in the original.] 
Gramlich (1990, p. 57), on the other hand, asserts that 
when measuring the utility gain to consumers from [a] price reduction … 
the income effect must be excluded. … To measure the utility gain 
exactly, an experimenter might ask the consumer [how much 
compensation he would be willing to accept in lieu of] the price change. 
While most texts discuss the concept of equivalent variation, none to my 
knowledge actually use it as the basis for welfare analysis. In some cases, the stated 
rationale for this omission is that a full understanding of equivalent variation requires 
“significant prerequisites in microeconomic theory [beyond the level that most potential 
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practitioners and decision-makers] can grasp given their limited exposure to economics” 
(Townley, 1998, p. xiii). While such a justification may be fine for a text that “has been 
written in such a way that only an introductory-level course in microeconomics is 
required as a prerequisite” (Townley, 1998, p. iv), it is clearly not appropriate for a text 
aimed at graduate and advanced undergraduate students. 
A useful first step towards updating the analytical basis of CBA texts might be the 
facility to construct a graphical depiction of a welfare analysis of a price-wealth change 
that is principally in terms of Hicksian demand curves as opposed to ordinary 
(Marshallian) ones. In the present paper, I provide such a facility in the context of a two-
good partial-equilibrium framework. I do so by way of several detailed examples, 
beginning with a “base case” example in Section 2, and then proceeding to modifications 
of that example along particular qualitative dimensions in Section 3. The resulting cases 
cover the scope of applicability of the technique. 
In Section 4, I develop a new formula for approximating aggregate equivalent 
variation in the maintained two-good framework, and then provide an analysis of this 
formula in relation to its Marshallian counterpart. Concluding remarks are provided in 
Section 5. 
 
2. An Example 
Following Sugden and Williams (1978, pp. 137–42), consider a government-
operated rail service between a city and one of its suburbs together with a competitive 
market for suburban rental housing. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the total 
demands for these goods are generated by a representative (utility-maximizing) 
consumer.1 A project is proposed that would reduce the price of rail trips by some 
amount. Assuming that rail trips and housing are normal goods and complements in 
consumption,2 such a price reduction would shift the ordinary demand curve for housing 
to the right. This would induce an increase in the price of housing that would, in turn, 
cause the ordinary demand curve for rail trips to shift to the left. Sugden and 
                                                 
1 As will be made clear below, the need for the existence of a representative consumer is easily 
expunged. 
2 And therefore, by the Slutsky equation, gross complements as well. 
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Williams (1978) argue that the consumer’s surplus in the rail market should be calculated 
as the area between the initial and final rail prices and to the left of the “observed” 
demand curve obtained by considering a price path that keeps the housing market in 
equilibrium as the price of rail trips is reduced in a monotonic sequence of very small 
steps. Since the consumer’s and producers’ surpluses in the housing market offset one 
another exactly along this price path, the overall (Marshallian) welfare measure is simply 
the consumer’s surplus in the rail market. 
A correct welfare analysis of the rail-price-reduction project would be in terms of 
equivalent variation—areas to the left of Hicksian (or compensated) demand curves for 
rail trips and housing at the after-project utility level. Since compensated price effects are 
symmetric, the line integral that defines such a Hicksian surplus measure is path 
independent. This means that the analyst is free to choose any price path connecting the 
initial and final prices of the two goods as the basis for determining the overall welfare 
effect. The simplest choices involve changing one price completely and then the other. 
In order to depict an equivalent variation analysis in graphical terms, it is 
necessary to be able to show the positions of particular Hicksian demand curves in price-
quantity space. Since such curves are not directly observable, this requirement boils down 
to showing how the Hicksian demand curves are related to their ordinary counterparts, 
which are observable in principle. Critical means to this end are provided by the Slutsky 
equation. 
Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 71) states the Slutsky equation in relation to “a 
continuous utility function representing a locally nonsatiated and strictly convex 
preference relation defined on the [m-dimensional Euclidean space]” as, for all 
commodity-price vectors p and total expenditures (or wealth levels) w, 
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where u = v(p, w), v(•) denotes the associated indirect utility function, and hℓ (•) and xℓ (•) 
denote the associated Hicksian and ordinary demand functions for commodity ℓ. Since 
both housing and rail trips are normal goods, this equation (with m = 2) tells us that, at 
the point of intersection between the ordinary and Hicksian demand curves for one of the 
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goods, holding the price of the other good fixed, the latter curve is steeper than the 
former. Since utility is a decreasing function of price along any ordinary demand curve, 
other things being equal, the corresponding family of Hicksian demand curves for a 
normal good is such that utility decreases from right to left in the relevant graph. 
If the chosen price path moves the price of housing from its initial value to its 
final value after the price of rail trips has been so moved, then the correct welfare 
analysis of the Sugden and Williams (1978, pp. 137–42) example is illustrated by 
Figure 1. Respectively, subscripts 1 and 2 denote rail trips and housing, and superscripts 
0 and 1 denote before- and after-project values. On the price path that moves p10 to 
p11 (< p10) and then p20 to p21 (> p20), the aggregate (consumer’s plus producers’) 
equivalent variation with respect to the housing market is the negative of the triangular 
area BCH bounded by the supply curve y2(p2), the Hicksian demand curve h2(p11, p2, u1) 
that passes through the after-project equilibrium point (given by the intersection of the 
supply curve and the shifted ordinary demand curve x2(p11, p2; w)), and a horizontal line 
drawn at the level of the initial housing price p20. 
 The relevant Hicksian demand curve in the market for rail trips is the one given 
by the initial price of housing and the after-project utility level. This curve must lie to 
right of the one given by the final price of housing and the after-project utility level since 
housing and rail trips are complements, and to the left of the one given by the initial price 
of housing and the (indirect) utility level at that price and the final price of rail trips since 
this utility level must be higher than the after-project utility level (on account of the fact 
that indirect utility functions are non-increasing in each commodity price). In algebraic 
terms, h1(p1, p20, u1) must lie to the right of h1(p1, p21, u1) and to the left of h1(p1, p20, u*), 
where u* := v(p11, p20) > v(p11, p21) =: u1. Both of these “reference” Hicksian demand 
curves are easy to locate in the graph of the market for rail trips: the former passes 
through the after-project equilibrium point (D); the latter intersects the initial demand 
curve at the final price of rail trips (point E). The equivalent variation with respect to the 
market for rail trips is the area p10FG p11 to the left of the relevant Hicksian demand curve 
between the initial and final prices of rail trips. Note that because this curve lies to the 
right of Sugden and Williams’ (1978) observed demand curve (through points A and D), 
it is unclear from a qualitative graphical illustration such as Figure 1 whether the overall 
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aggregate equivalent variation p10FG p11 – BCH is larger or smaller than its Marshallian 
counterpart (p10AD p11). 
If, instead of being competitive, the supply of housing were controlled by a single 
producer with a constant marginal cost of production c2, the equivalent variation with 
respect to the market for rail trips would be (qualitatively) the same, but the aggregate 
equivalent variation with respect to the housing market would be the rectangular area 
BIJK bounded by the marginal cost curve, a horizontal line drawn at the level of the 
initial housing price, and vertical lines drawn at the levels of the before- and after-project 
quantities of housing exchanged (x20 and x 21), less the triangular area CHI bounded by 
the Hicksian demand curve h2(p11, p2, u1) that passes through the after-project equilibrium 
point (given by the intersection of the monopoly expansion path y2*(p2) and the shifted 
ordinary demand curve x2(p11, p2; w)), the horizontal line drawn at the level of the initial 
housing price, and the vertical line drawn at the level of the after-project quantity of 
housing exchanged. This variant of the Sugden and Williams (1978, pp. 137–42) example 
is illustrated by Figure 2. 
The monopoly expansion path y2*(p2) is the locus of output-price combinations 
chosen by the housing producer as the ordinary demand for housing varies due to changes 
in the price of rail trips. The relationship between the price of rail trips and the 
monopoly’s output, p1 = φ(x2), is given by the solution to the first-order necessary 
condition for profit maximization 
,),(),( 22
2
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where P2(x2, p1) denotes the inverse ordinary demand for housing. Inverting P2(x2, p1) 
after substituting φ(x2) for p1 yields y2*(p2). Clearly, this approach can be generalized to 
accommodate more complex market structures; e.g., Cournot competition among m firms 
with possibly different, possibly non-constant, cost functions. 
The maintained assumption that the total demands for the two goods are generated 
by a representative consumer can be relaxed at the cost of a minor reinterpretation of the 
supply curve y2(p2). To see that this is so, suppose there are n consumers with possibly 
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different ordinary demand functions. The total demand for either commodity is the sum 
of the corresponding individual demands. In particular, the total demand for housing is 
.),(:),( 21)(2212 ∑=
i
i ppxppX  
Letting Y2(p2) denote the total supply of housing, the market clearing condition 
)(),( 22212 pYppX =  
yields p1 = ψ(p2), the relationship between the price of rail trips and the equilibrium price 
of housing. Substituting ψ(p2) for p1 in x2(i)(p1, p2) yields the consumer expansion path 
y2(i)(p2). Thus, under the interpretation of hℓ (p1, p2, u) and xℓ (p1, p2) as the Hicksian and 
ordinary demands for commodity ℓ of an individual consumer and y2(p2) as the expansion 
path along which he adjusts his quantity demanded of housing in response to variations in 
p1, the expression ∆µΣEV(i) := p10FG p11 – BCH is the aggregate equivalent variation with 
respect to that consumer; i.e., the consumer’s equivalent variation ∆µEV(i) := p10FG p11 – 
p21CH p20 plus the portion of the producers’ equivalent variation due to that consumer 
∆π(i) := p21CB p20. 
Now assume that the n consumers can be partitioned into two groups: one in 
which each individual owns a share of the housing industry θi > 0 and has zero demands 
for rail trips and housing, and one in which θi ≡ 0. Assume further that Σiθi = 1. Hence, 
the equivalent variation of individual i in the shareholding group is ∆µEV,i = ∆wi ≡ 
θiΣj∆π(j) (since ∆µEV(i) ≡ 0), and that of individual i in the non-shareholding group is 
∆µEV,i = ∆µEV(i) (since ∆wi ≡ 0).3
Simply summing the aggregate equivalent variations with respect to each 
consumer or, equivalently, summing the individual equivalent variations,4 “as is 
common, embodies a version of utilitarianism [and thereby] ignores distributional 
concerns” (Slesnick, p. 2141). Moreover, Blackorby and Donaldson (1990, Sections III 
and IV) have shown that the sum of equivalent variations in general equilibrium contexts 
must be non-positive for any move away from a Walrasian equilibrium and, if 
                                                 
3 In general, ∆µEV,i = ∆wi + ∆µEV(i) , where ∆wi := wi1 – wi0 and 
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4 Σi∆µΣEV(i) ≡ Σi∆µEV,i . 
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preferences and technologies are convex, for any move away from an efficient allocation.  
The implication of this result for the present context is that Σi∆µEV,i might exhibit a 
downward bias relative to a hypothetical, ideal efficiency measure. 
Note that the ∆µEV,is, treated as functions of (p1, wi1), are (indirect) money metrics 
with reference prices p0. Money metrics can be aggregated using a social-welfare-type 
function Γ(•), which can then be used to compare alternative price-wealth situations in 
relation to the status quo. According to Donaldson (1992, p. 92), the social binary relation 
R defined implicitly by Γ(•) 
is always an ordering. There are never problems of preference reversals, 
even with [consumer]-specific prices. Further, the function Γ(•) may 
exhibit inequality aversion, and different degrees of inequality aversion 
can be incorporated by employing a single-parameter family of functions 
such as the S-Ginis. … The ordering R, in general, does depend on p0, of 
course …. 
In order for social decision rules based on Γ(•) to be “consistent with usual distributional 
judgments,” the ∆µEV,is must be concave in wealth for all price vectors. Otherwise, such 
rules “may recommend that a fixed total [wealth] should be given entirely to one person, 
even when Γ(•) … is quasiconcave.” The ∆µEV,is are concave in wealth for all price 
vectors if and only if each individual’s preferences are quasihomothetic5 (Blackorby and 
Donaldson, 1988, Theorem 2), a property that does not characterize the preferences of 
real consumers. 
One possible choice for Γ(•) is a weighted sum. Following Pearce and Nash 
(1981, pp. 32–3), the weights could be chosen to be 
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where jjn ww Σ= 1:  and γ > 0. Suppose that, for the sake of simplicity, there are nR 
identical individuals in the shareholding group and nP identical individuals in the non-
shareholding group (nR + nP ≡ n), and wR > wP ; i.e., the nR shareholders constitute “the 
rich” and the nP non-shareholders constitute “the poor.” In this case, the social welfare 
measure of the rail-price-reduction project would be 
                                                 
5 Note that this property holds (trivially) for each individual in the shareholding group of the 
present example. 
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Thus, the wider is the gap between the rich and the poor (wR / wP), ceteris paribus, the 
heavier is the weight placed on the net benefits accruing to the latter group (∆µEV) 
relative to those accruing to the former (∆π). Furthermore, the higher is the fraction of 
poor individuals (nP / n), ceteris paribus, the lower is the weight placed on the overall net 
benefit. Note that both of these effects vary directly with the magnitude of the γ 
parameter, the degree of inequality aversion.6
While problematic with respect to the construction of a social ordering, especially 
in general equilibrium contexts, a social decision rule based on some Γ(•) is arguably 
sufficient for the purposes of CBA. The usual objective of a CBA is to provide an 
assessment of the social desirability of one or more alternative projects in relation to one 
another and the status quo. The projects under consideration are usually variations on a 
fairly narrowly defined proposal such as, for example, the construction of a highway 
between locations A and B. Alternative routes or the possibility of levying a toll may be 
considered, but 
[r]arely does the analyst compare a highway project more broadly to 
completely different types of projects, such as health care, antipoverty, or 
national defense projects. As a practical matter, full optimization is 
impossible (Boardman et al., 2001, p. 9). 
Cognitive capacity limitations, budgetary and/or political constraints, and limited data 
availability are the major factors that work against welfare measurement in practice. 
Incremental improvements to social welfare sanctioned by generalized-aggregate-
equivalent-variation-based cost-benefit analyses is most probably the best that can be 
hoped for. 
 
                                                 
6 Note also that if γ = 0, then Γ(•) reduces to the overall aggregate equivalent variation. 
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3. Modifications 
The two-good partial-equilibrium model analyzed above can be modified to some 
extent with respect to the qualitative characteristics of the goods without changing its 
essential structure. The Slutsky equation provides four rules that govern the relationships 
among these characteristics: a good that is both a complement and normal must also be a 
gross complement (C ∧ N ⇒ GC); a good that is both a gross complement and inferior 
must also be a complement (GC ∧ I ⇒ C); a good that is both a substitute and inferior 
must also be a gross substitute (S ∧ I ⇒ GS); and a good that is both a gross substitute 
and normal must also be a substitute (GS ∧ N ⇒ S). The symmetry property of 
compensated price effects provides a fifth rule: the two goods are either both substitutes 
or both complements. These five rules imply eighteen distinct cases: 
(i) C ∧ (N, N) ⇒ (GC, GC) 
(ii), (iii) C ∧ (N, I) ⇒ (GC, GC) ∨ (GC, GS) 
(iv), (v) C ∧ (I, N) ⇒ (GC, GC) ∨ (GS, GC) 
(vi)–(ix) C ∧ (I, I) ⇒ (GC, GC) ∨ (GC, GS) ∨ (GS, GC) ∨ (GS, GS) 
(x) S ∧ (I, I) ⇒ (GS, GS) 
(xi), (xii) S ∧ (I, N) ⇒ (GS, GS) ∨ (GS, GC) 
(xiii), (xiv) S ∧ (N, I) ⇒ (GS, GS) ∨ (GC, GS) 
(xv)–(xviii) S ∧ (N, N) ⇒ (GS, GS) ∨ (GS, GC) ∨ (GC, GS) ∨ (GC, GC) 
Each of these cases can be characterized by a combination of one of eight possible 
graphs for the first good (“rail trips”) together with one of four possible graphs for the 
second good (“housing”). The eight possible graphs for the first good differ with respect 
to the direction of the shift of the initial ordinary demand curve (L or R), whether the 
ordinary demand curves are flatter than their Hicksian counterparts (F) or vice versa (V), 
and the position of the relevant Hicksian demand curve (either to the left or to the right of 
one of the two reference Hicksian demand curves—hereinafter called D and E after the 
names of the critical points they pass through). The four possible graphs for the second 
good differ with respect to the direction of the shift of the initial ordinary demand curve 
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and whether or not the ordinary demand curves are flatter than their Hicksian 
counterparts. More specifically, the twelve graphs and the cases they help to characterize 
are summarized as follows: 
L-F-LE  →  (i), (ii) 
L-F-RE  →  (xiii), (xv), (xviii) 
L-V-LE  →  (x), (xi) 
L-V-RE  →  (iv), (vi), (ix) 
R-F-LD  →  (iii) 
R-F-RD  →  (xiv), (xvi), (xvii) 
R-V-LD  →  (xii) 
R-V-RD  →  (v), (vii), (viii) 
R-F  →  (i), (iv), (v), (xii), (xvi), (xviii) 
R-V  →  (ii), (vi), (viii) 
L-F  →  (xi), (xv), (xvii) 
L-V  →  (iii), (vii), (ix), (x), (xiii), (xiv) 
In the preceding list, the notation that the relevant Hicksian demand curve lies to the left 
of one of the reference curves (LD or LE) means that it also lies to the right of the other 
(RE or RD), and the notation that it lies to the right of D or E means that it is situated 
even further to the right of E or D. 
The twelve graphs are shown in Figures 1 and 3 through 11 and are ordered by the 
cases they characterize: Figure 1 shows the two case-(i) graphs (discussed in the 
preceding section); Figure 3 shows the graph of good 2 required to characterize case (ii) 
(along with the graph of good 1 in Figure 1); Figure 4 shows the two case-(iii) graphs; 
Figure 5 shows the graph of good 1 required to characterize case (iv) (along with the 
graph of good 2 in Figure 1); etc. 
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4. Approximations 
It is common practice in standard CBA to obtain rough estimates of Marshallian 
surpluses by assuming that the relevant demand and supply curves are locally linear. In 
the Sugden and Williams (1978, pp. 137–42) example, the assumption that the observed 
demand curve for rail service is linear on the subdomain [p11,  p10] allows the associated 
Marshallian surplus p10AD p11 to be calculated using the mathematical formula for the 
area of a trapezoid as 
[ ] ,2 111
1
1*
1112
11
1
0
112
1 x
p
ppxxpsM ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∆−∆−=+∆−=∆ ε  
where ∆p1 := p11 – p10 and ε11* denotes the price elasticity of observed demand (at 
point D). Similar assumptions with respect to the relevant Hicksian demand curves enable 
the calculation of an approximation to the aggregate equivalent variation. The present 
section develops a formula along these lines that is applicable in the context of the 
maintained two-good partial equilibrium model. 
The slope of the relevant Hicksian demand curve in the housing market at point C 
can be written as 
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where ξ221 denotes the price elasticity of compensated demand for housing. Assuming 
that h2(p11, p2, u1) is linear on the subdomain [min{p20,  p21}, max{p20,  p21}], the x2-
coordinate of point H is given by the straight-line equation 
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and the area of the triangle BCH may be calculated as 
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where ∆p2 := p21 – p20 and ∆x2 := x21 – x20. 
The rate of change of the compensated demand for rail service at point D with 
respect to a change in the price of housing is 
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where ξ121 denotes the housing-price elasticity of compensated demand for rail service. 
Assuming that h1(p11, p2, u1) is linear on the subdomain [min{p20,  p21}, max{p20,  p21}], 
the x1-coordinate of point G is given by the straight-line equation 
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Also, the slope of the relevant Hicksian demand curve for rail service at point G can be 
written as 
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where ξ11* denotes the price elasticity of compensated demand for rail service. Now, 
assuming that h1(p1, p20, u1) is linear on the subdomain [p11,  p10], the x1-coordinate of 
point F is given by the straight-line equation 
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and the area of the trapezoid p10FG p11 may be calculated as 
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Thus, the aggregate equivalent variation (p10FG p11 – BCH) may be estimated as 
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The apparent difficulty of the compensated demand elasticities in this formula not being 
directly observable is easily dealt with by means of the elasticity form of the Slutsky 
equation: 
{ },,,1, mkkkk Kllll ∈∀+= αηεξ  
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where ξℓk := ∂ln hℓ (p, u) / ∂ln pk and εℓk := ∂ln xℓ (p, w) / ∂ln pk are the price elasticities of 
compensated and ordinary demand, respectively, ηℓ := ∂ln xℓ (p, w) / ∂ln w is the wealth 
elasticity of demand, and αk := pk xk (p, w) / w is the expenditure share of good k. 
The area BCH is zero if and only if either the housing supply is perfectly elastic 
(so that ∆p2 = 0) or both the supply and the compensated demand for housing are 
perfectly inelastic and coincident (so that ∆x2 = ξ221 = 0). Otherwise, this area offsets, to 
some extent, the welfare gain measured by the area p10FG p11 in the determination of 
∆µΣEV (since ∆p2∆x2 > 0 and ξ221 < 0). 
Under the assumption that η1α1 = 0 at point G, ξ11* = ε 11*. The areas p10FG p11 
and p10AD p11 are then equal if and only if ξ121∆p2 = 0; i.e., if and only if the Hicksian 
demands h1(p1, p20, u1) and h1(p1, p21, u1) are both equal to the observed demand x1*(p1) 
on the subdomain [p11,  p10] so that point F coincides with point A and point G coincides 
with point D.7
Inspection of Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 reveals the possibility of several different 
situations in which the equivalent variation p10FG p11 is equal to the Marshallian surplus 
p10AD p11. The prevalence of such situations—and close approximations to them—in 
relevant applied contexts is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this paper. It 
would seem reasonable to claim, however, that such situations are comparatively rare. 
A simple numerical example may be a useful means of consolidating the 
foregoing analysis. Following Sugden and Williams (1978, pp. 141–2) once more, 
suppose that (p10, x10) = (1.2, 9000), (p11, x11) = (1, 10000), (p20, x20) = (9.5, 950), and 
(p21, x21) = (10, 1000). Then ∆p1 = –.2, ∆x1 = 1000, ∆p2 = .5, ∆x2 = 50 and 
,5.
10000
1
2.
1000
1
1
1
1
1
1*
11 −=−=∆
∆=
x
p
p
xε  
which implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) .190010000
1
2.5.22.2
1 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−−=∆ Ms  
                                                 
7 If ∆p2 = 0, then point E coincides with point D as well. 
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Suppose further that ε11 = –.6, ε12 = –.9, ε22 = –.4, η1 = η2 = .8, and α1 = α2 = .25.8 Then 
( )( ) ,4.25.8.6.11 −=+−=ξ  
( )( ) ,7.25.8.9.12 −=+−=ξ  
( )( ) ,2.25.8.4.22 −=+−=ξ  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.2.1972
152.1987
1000
10
5.2.505.10000
10
5.7.1
1
2.4.22. 2
1
2
1
=
−=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−−=∆ ΣEVµ
 
The percentage difference between ∆µΣEV and ∆sM is 3.8. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The figures included in this paper provide a basis for a wide range of 
straightforward examples of correct welfare analyses of price-income changes. While the 
microeconomic theory underpinning these figures is certainly beyond that of a standard 
introductory-level course, it is assuredly not beyond that of relatively non-technical 
intermediate-level undergraduate texts. For example, Hicksian demand curves and 
equivalent variation are both discussed intuitively and fairly thoroughly in Eaton et al. 
(2002, pp. 125–27, 135–40). Since any such discussion can serve as an adequate prelude 
to the understanding of the figures herein, most of the associated analysis should be 
accessible to advanced undergraduates. 
The approximation formula for aggregate equivalent variation developed in the 
preceding section should be of some assistance in easing practitioners of CBA out of their 
reliance on consumer surplus measures. Ultimately, of course, it is to be hoped that the 
use of distributionally sensitive equivalent-variation aggregates will become the norm in 
cases where sufficient data are available.
                                                 
8 Note that the chosen expenditure-share values are consistent with the fact that p11 x11 = p21 x21 = 
10000. 
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